Sign up to get our analysis and data on how business, politics and economics intersect around the world.
It’s a trope in trans-Atlantic relations that the United States is the indispensable partner. The adage has proven true in supporting Ukraine’s resistance to the ongoing Russian invasion, with America providing the lion’s share of monetary and in-kind support, as well as more intangible leadership. But amid growing fear of lasting congressional gridlock on aid to Ukraine and the diversion of U.S. attention and resources to Israel after the Oct. 7 Hamas attacks, the urgency for European NATO allies to have a viable, if imperfect, Plan B has spiked again. For many Western European countries, the lynchpin of that Plan B is a more robust German military girded by increased spending.
In the immediate aftermath of Russia’s invasion in February 2022, the newly minted German Chancellor Olaf Scholz heartened his European counterparts by declaring a pivot, or “Zeitenwende,” toward greater defense spending and leadership. The rhetoric was followed up by action, with Germany releasing its first ever national security strategy, promising that the European economic powerhouse would finally fulfill its NATO commitment of spending 2% of its gross domestic product on defense.
German society is somewhat divided on whether the time is right for such a pivot. Most Germans think it is time for their country to rearm, but sizable shares also think it should continue to wait.
German adults’ reticence is motivated less by history and more by budgetary constraints
Germany significantly underspends on its NATO commitments — like most Western European alliance members. But Germany has long been considered a somewhat special case. Adding to clear free-riding incentives that lead many NATO allies to fall short of their own spending commitments are Germany’s strong domestic pacifist tendencies, which stem in part from the legacy of the country’s role as aggressor in World War II. Today, however, more Germans who oppose rearmament articulate their opposition in financial, rather than historical, terms.
The politics of rearmament may not be the same as the politics of support for Ukraine
While the catalyst for the Zeitenwende was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the dynamics of German rearmament may not be conducive to significantly greater military support for Ukraine. In general, German adults across the political spectrum think their government is doing either “too much” (28%) or “about the right amount” (35%) to counter Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Compared with all adults, Germans who believe that now is the time for rearmament (30%) are 9 percentage points more likely to say Germany should be doing more for Ukraine, but the same total share (63%) among each group think Germany is doing enough or too much.
The same disconnect between rearming and greater support for Ukraine can be seen when breaking the numbers down by political party. It is particularly dramatic among adherents of the far-right Alternative for Germany: A slim majority (51%) of their supporters favor rearmament, but 60% think Germany is doing too much for Ukraine.
German weakness could be a greater threat to Europe than German strength
Unfortunately for advocates of greater European military autonomy, the German pivot has started to look more like a smaller course correction — still important for the future of European security by changing the long-term trajectory, but not a game changer in the short run. Germany’s European neighbors — many of whom have strong historical precedent for fearing German military strength — may nevertheless have greater reason to worry about German weakness as they look at events to the east. In the words of former Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, Germany’s European allies have begun to “fear German power less than German inactivity.”
ncG1vNJzZmiooqR7rrvRp6Cnn5Oku7TBy61lnKedZK6vrcuyqqKrX5yys7nAp2SrnZGnuqK5xKerZq2bp66qusRmmKKc